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Summary  Security  of  data,  especially  in  clouds,  has  become  immensely  essential  for  present-
day applications.  Fully  homomorphic  encryption  (FHE)  is  a  great  way  to  secure  data  which  is  used
and manipulated  by  untrusted  applications  or  systems.  In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  symmetric
FHE scheme  based  on  polynomial  over  ring  of  integers.  This  scheme  is  somewhat  homomorphic
due to  accumulation  of  noise  after  few  operations,  which  is  made  fully  homomorphic  using
a refresh  procedure.  After  certain  amount  of  homomorphic  computations,  large  ciphertextsRefresh are refreshed  for  proper  decryption.  The  hardness  of  the  scheme  is  based  on  the  difﬁculty  of
factorizing  large  integers.  Also,  it  requires  polynomial  addition  which  is  computationally  cost
effective.  Experimental  results  are  shown  to  support  our  claim.
© 2016  Published  by  Elsevier  GmbH.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ully  homomorphic  encryption  (FHE)  schemes  enable  any-
ne  to  perform  arbitrary  homomorphic  operations  on  the
iphertexts  which  can  be  ﬁnally  decrypted  to  get  equivalent
esults  on  the  plaintexts.  Let  us  consider  a  fully  homo-
orphic  encryption  where  the  encryptions  of  plaintexts
1 and  p2 be  Enc(p1)  and  Enc(p2)  respectively,  then  both
nc(p1 +  p2)  and  Enc(p1p2)  can  be  computed.  FHE  is  used
 This article belongs to the special issue on Engineering and Mate-
ial Sciences.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: smaranikadasgupta@gmail.com (S. Dasgupta),
kptech@yahoo.com (S.K. Pal).
G
m
h
t
(
i
o
c
p
k
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pisc.2016.06.061
213-0209/© 2016 Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access art
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).n  cloud  computing  where  processing  of  encrypted  data  is
equired  by  third  parties  without  the  knowledge  of  secret
ey.  Apart  from  clouds,  there  are  many  more  applications  of
omomorphic  encryption  schemes  such  as  e-voting,  private
ata  processing,  encrypted  search,  etc.
The  ﬁrst  fully  homomorphic  scheme  was  proposed  by
entry  (2009), which  involves  creating  a  somewhat  homo-
orphic  scheme  and  further  bootstrapping  to  make  it  fully
omomorphic.  Due  to  computational  complexities,  Gen-
ry’s  scheme  is  practically  infeasible.  Gentry  and  Halevi
2011)  successfully  implemented  Gentry’s  scheme  over
deal  lattices.  Though  they  incorporated  many  noticeable
ptimizations,  the  scheme  still  remains  computationally
omplex.  The  authors  van  Dijk  et  al.  (2010)  presented  a  sim-
ler  scheme  over  integers  instead  of  ideal  lattices,  but  the
ey  size  was  too  large  for  practical  purposes.  Coron  et  al.
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dDesign  of  a  polynomial  ring  based  symmetric  homomorphic  e
(2011)  proposed  an  idea  to  reduce  the  public  key  size  of  a
homomorphic  scheme,  which  was  further  reduced  by  Stehle
and  Steinfeld  (2011).  Brakerski  and  Vaikuntanathan  (2011)
proposed  that  a  FHE  can  be  based  on  the  hardness  of  the
Learning  With  Error  (LWE)  problem.  Xiao  et  al.  (2012)  showed
how  hardness  of  large  integer  factorization  of  ciphertext
using  symmetric  key  can  be  the  base  for  security  of  a  homo-
morphic  scheme.
A  number  of  asymmetric  FHE  schemes  have  been  pro-
posed  in  the  last  few  years  based  on  ideal  lattices,  LWE,
approximate  GCD,  etc.  For  many  present  day  applica-
tions,  efﬁcient  symmetric  FHE  are  also  required.  Gupta  and
Sharma  (2013)  came  out  with  a  scheme  that  used  sym-
metric  keys  of  smaller  size  based  on  operations  involving
matrix  computations  like  matrix  inversion,  thus  making  it
slightly  computationally  expensive.  Sharma  (2014)  proposed
a  scheme  which  works  with  single  bit  and  was  gener-
alized  by  Aggarwal  et  al.  (2014)  to  work  on  integers.
Other  symmetric  key  encryption  schemes  were  proposed
by  Kipnis  and  Hibshoosh,  Burtyka  and  Makarevich,  Li  and
Wang.
Mathematical background
Integer  factorization  problem
Integer  factorization  is  the  decomposition  of  a  composite
number  into  its  divisors,  whose  product  equals  the  original
integer.  Let  us  take  a  composite  number  n.  The  difﬁculty  in
determining  its  prime  factors  is  referred  to  as  the  integer
factorization  problem.
Ring  of  polynomials
Let  R  be  a  ring.  Deﬁne  R[x]  =  {a0 +  a1x  +  · ·  · +  anxn|ai ∈  R}
where  x  is  indeterminate  and  p(x)  =  a0 +  a1x  +  ·  ·  ·  +  anxn is
called  a  polynomial  in  x  over  R.
Some  properties  and  results:
• 0  +  0.x  +  ·  ·  ·  +0.xn is  called  the  zero  polynomial.
•  If  p(x)  =  a0 +  a1x  +  ·  ·  ·  +  anxn ;  an /=  0,  ai ∈  R,  then  n  is
called  the  degree  of  the  polynomial  p(x).
•  Let  p(x)  =
n∑
i=0
aix
i and  q(x)  =
m∑
i=0
bix
i over  R  of  degree
n  and  m  respectively.  Deﬁne  ‘+’  on  R[x]  as  p(x)  +  q(x)  =
max{n,m}∑
i=0
(ai +  bi)xi;  ai =  0,  ∀i  >  n;  bi =  0,  ∀i  >  m,
deﬁne  ‘∗’  on  R[x]  as  p (x) ∗  q (x) =
n+m∑
i=0
cix
i;  ci =
∑
r+s=i
ar ∗  bs, then  R[x]  forms  a  ring  with  respect  to
the  above  binary  operations  and  is  called  the  ring  of
polynomials  over  R.•  If  R  is  commutative  ring  with  unity  or  integral  domain,
then  so  is  R[x].
•  Let  p (x) ∈  R [x] . ˛  ∈  R  be  a  zero  of  p (x) i.e.,  p (˛) = 0,
then  it  is  called  a  zero  of  the  ring.
A
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ing  homomorphism
eﬁnition.  (Ring  homomorphism)  If  R  and  S  are  rings,  a
unction  f  :  R  →  S  is  a  ring  homomorphism  if  ∀r1,  r2 ∈  R.
a)  f (r1 +  r2) =  f (r1) +  f (r2) ,
b)  f (r1 ∗  r2) =  f (r1) ∗  f (r2) ,
c)  f (1R) = 1S.
emma.  Let  R  and  S  be  rings  and  function  f  : R  →  S  be  a
ing  map,  then
a)  f (0) = 0.
b)  f (−r) =  −f (r) ,  ∀r  ∈  R.
roof.  (a)  f (0) = f (0 +  0) =  f (0) +  f (0) .  So,  f (0) = 0.
By  (a),  0  =  f (0) = f (r + (−r)) =  f (r) +  f (−r) which
mplies  f (−r) =  −f (r) .
eﬁnition.  (Kernel  of  a  ring  map)  The  kernel  of  a  ring  map
 :  R  →  S  is  kerf  =  {r  ∈  R|f (r) = 0}.
eﬁnition.  (Image  of  a  ring  map)  The  image  of  a  ring  map
 :  R  →  S  is  im  f  =  {f (r) |r ∈  R}.
eﬁnition.  (Ring  isomorphism)  Let  R and  S  be  rings.  A  ring
somorphism  from  R  to  S  is  a  bijective  ring  homomorphism
 :  R  →  S.
Some  of  these  concepts  are  used  in  the  proposed  scheme.
roposed scheme
he  proposed  scheme  is  a  symmetric  FHE  based  on  poly-
omial  rings  over  integers.  Basically  it  is  a  somewhat
omomorphic  encryption  scheme  which  is  made  fully  homo-
orphic  by  a  refresh  mechanism.  If  M  be  an  integer  which
s  a  multiple  of  another  integer  N,  then  we  know  that  for
ny  x1,  x2, x1 ≡  x2modN remains  unaffected  if  x1 ≡  x2modM
s  performed.  This  concept  is  used  to  construct  the  refresh
ey,  which  is  made  publicly  available  without  revealing  the
ecret  key.
The  security  parameter  of  the  scheme  is  .  Message  space
s  ZN.  The  integer  message  is  taken  in  its  binary  form  or  the
essage  can  be  a  binary  number  of  several  bits.  Suppose  the
inary  message  (m)  be  of  length  (n  +  1)  bits.
lgorithm  1.  KeyGen()
.  Generate  secret  key  Sk, a  prime  number  of  length    bits.
.  Choose  an  even  integer  z  of  length    randomly  where
  =  log2.
.  Refresh  key  Rk =  z  * Sk.
Let  m  be  encoded  into  message  polynomial  mp(x)  of
egree  n  with  coefﬁcients  representing  each  bit  of  m.lgorithm  2.  Enc  (mp(x),  Sk, n)
.  Choose  a  polynomial  y(x)  of  degree  n  such  that
mp(x)  ≡  y(x)modSk.
6 S.  Dasgupta,  S.K.  Pal
2
3
4
5
A
1
d
s
t
A
1
H
A
t
t
i
E
•
•
O
I
F
h
i
o
f
d
T
v
6
Table  1  Runtimes  of  encryption  and  decryption  modules.
Bits  5  bits  of  message  6  bits  of  message
Encryption
(ms)
Decryption
(ms)
Encryption
(ms)
Decryption
(ms)
64  20  13  20  18
80 45  66  48  78
96 84  140  100  167
128  255  493  306  578
192  1477  3364  2247  6409
Security  parameter  leng th 
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
0
2
4
6
Encryption  time (second s) for  5 (red ) & 6 (blue ) bit message s
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
0
5
10
15
Decryption  time (second s) for  5 (red ) & 6 (blue ) bit message s
Figure  1  Security  parameter  length  versus  encryption  and
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.  Randomly  pick  a  polynomial  d(x)  of  degree  n.
.  Coefﬁcients  of  d(x)  are  integer  of  length  a.
.  Compute  c(x)  =  y(x)  +  Sk *  d(x).
.  c(x)  is  the  encrypted  message  polynomial.
lgorithm  3.  Dec  (c(x),  Sk,  n)
.  Compute  c(x)modSkmod2  =  mp(x).
After  some  operations  on  the  ciphertext,  the  noise  pro-
uced  may  exceed  thereby  making  decryption  incorrect.  In
uch  case,  one  step  refresh  procedure  is  used  to  eliminate
he  noise.
lgorithm  4.  Refresh  (c(x),  Rk,  n)
.  Compute  c’(x)  =  c(x)modRk.
omomorphic  properties
ddition/multiplication  of  two  binary  polynomial  plain-
exts  (OR/AND  operations)  is  homomorphic  to  addi-
ion/multiplication  of  two  polynomial  ciphertexts  with
nteger  coefﬁcients.
xample:  Let  Sk =  13
m1 =  65  ≡  1000001
mp1 (x)  =  x6 +  1
y1(x)  =  27x6 +  13x5 +  26x3 +  14
d1(x)  =  2650x6 +  995x5 +  259x2 +  100
c1(x)  =  34477x6 +  12948x5 +  26x3 +  3367x2 +  1314
c1(x)mod  Skmod  2  =  x6 +  1  ≡  mp1 (x)
m2 =  56  ≡  111000
mp2 (x)  =  x5 +  x4 +  x3
y2(x)  =  14x5 +  27x4 +  40x3
d2(x)  =  119x5 +  224x4 +  17x3 +  2249x2 +  36
c2(x)  =  1561x5 +  2939x4 +  261x3 +  29237x2 +  468
c2(x)mod  Skmod  2  =  x5 +  x4 +  x3 ≡  mp2 (x)
 Additive  homomorphic
[(c1 +  c2)(x)]mod  Skmod  2  =  x6 +  x5 +  x4 +  x3 +  1
≡ (mp1 +  mp2 )(x)
m1 +  m2 =  1111001
 Multiplicative  homomorphic
[(c1 ∗  c2)(x)]mod  Skmod  2  =  x11 +  x10 +  x9 +  x5 +  x4 +  x3
≡  (mp1 ∗  mp2 )(x)
m1 ∗  m2 =  111000111000
bservations and analysis
n  this  scheme  the  length  of  polynomial  d(x)  is  taken  a bits.
or  security  and  computational  efﬁciency,  the  value  of  a
as  been  taken  as  3,  4,  5,  6.  The  proposed  scheme  was
mplemented  in  C  using  GNU  multi  precision  library  (GMP)
n  3  GHz  processor  with  4  GB  RAM.  Taking  coefﬁcient  of  d(x)
rom  Z of  length  4 bits,  observed  runtimes  of  encryption  and
ecryption  for  5  and  6  bits  of  message  are  given  in  Table  1.
he  graph  shown  in  Fig.  1  depicts  security  parameter  length
ersus  encryption  and  decryption  time  in  seconds  for  5  and
 bits  of  message  with  coefﬁcient  of  d(x)  from  Z of  length  5
Gecryption  time.
its.  For  all  the  given  bit  lengths,  key  generation  time  was
n  fraction  of  milliseconds.
onclusions and future work
n  this  paper  we  proposed  a  symmetric  FHE  scheme  based
n  polynomial  rings  over  integers.  Experimental  results  show
hat  the  scheme  can  be  used  for  present  day  practical  appli-
ations.  Future  work  will  include  cryptanalysis  of  symmetric
ey  FHE  schemes  and  design  of  practically  usable  ring  based
symmetric  FHE  schemes.
eferences
ggarwal, N., Gupta, C.P., Sharma, I., 2014. Fully homomorphic
encryption scheme without bootstrapping. In: CCIOT 2014, pp.
14—16.
rakerski, Z., Vaikuntanathan, V., 2011. Efﬁcient fully homomorphic
encryption from (standard) LWE. In: FOCS.
oron, J.-S., Mandal, A., Naccache, D., Tibouchi, M., 2011. Fully
homomorphic encryption over the integers with shorter public-
keys. In: Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2011, Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, pp. 487—504.
entry, C., 2009. A fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lat-
tices. In: STOC, vol. 9, pp. 169—178.entry, C., Halevi, S., 2011. Implementing Gentry’s fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme. In: EUROCRYPT 2011, LNCS.
Springer.
ncry
v
in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2010. Springer, pp. 24—43.Design  of  a  polynomial  ring  based  symmetric  homomorphic  e
Gupta, C.P., Sharma, I., 2013. A fully homomorphic encryption
scheme with symmetric keys with application to private data
processing in clouds. In: NOF 2013, pp. 23—25.Sharma, I., 2014. A symmetric FHE scheme based on Linear Algebra.
In: IJCSET, vol. 5.
Stehle, D., Steinfeld, R., 2011. Faster fully homomorphic encryp-
tion, Cryptology ePrint archive, Report.
Xption  scheme  695
an Dijk, M., Gentry, C., Halevi, S., Vaikuntanathan, V., 2010.
Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers. In: Advancesiao, L., Bastani, O., I-Ling, Y., 2012. An efﬁcient homomorphic
encryption protocol for multi-user systems. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 193.
